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Abstract
This essay examines neoliberal forms of resource governance and emerging struggles over
control of sea space between coastal fishers, the para-statal oil industry and government
authorities in the State of Tabasco, Mexico. The analysis focuses on the changing
mechanisms of resource governance and networking related to contested claims over rights to
offshore space. The study is based on material collected during ethnographic field research in
Tabasco in 2011–2014. By linking a post-Foucauldian approach to governmentality with a
Deleuzian perspective on networks, our research examines resource governance as a socio-
political arena, constructed in negotiation between multiple governmental, private and civil
society actors, including heterogeneous groups from local populations. The study
demonstrates how hybrid techniques of resource governance lead to fishers’ socio-spatial
displacement, marginalization in the fields of political representation and subjection to ideas
of aquaculture entrepreneurship. The ensemble of private regulation and governmental control
provides a venue for drawing fishers into clientelist practices of governing while it diffuses
questions of responsibility. These modes of governance fragment the fishers’ efforts to
mobilize politically, making them rely on less visible networks of contestation shaped by
heterogeneous fishing groups, with varying access to resources and political representation.
Recent transformations in environmental legislation and the fishers’ mobile tactics to
networking may offer opportunities for them to reclaim their resource rights.
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1. Introduction
Emilio, a political leader among cooperative fishers in Tabasco, launched my fieldwork with
a serious lecture. On the second day of my three-month stay in his family, Emilio devoted
three hours to explaining fishing politics in one of Mexico’s most important oil-producing
regions. He quoted excerpts from complex federal laws on fishing and cooperativism, and
explained the problems fishers face with regards the implementation and enforcement of
existing legislation. Though he quit school at the age of twelve in order to devote his time to
fishing, he demonstrated an impressive fluency in the applicable law and a sound grasp of
underlying politics.
Emilio said the big change came when the federal government established a
15,900 km2 marine zone of exclusion around oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico in 2003.
Access to the zone was limited exclusively to the oil industry to protect against terrorist
attacks. The government is trying to persuade fishers to leave the sea and become fish
farmers, though few have either the desire or the finances to leave fishing and obtain the land
required for an aquaculture operation. Many fishers prefer sea fishing because it is what they
are used to, though in search of fishing areas away from the oil rigs, they are travelling into
riskier, less familiar waters.
Emilio’s remarks on the role of legislation in the fierce competition for offshore space
between fishers, the oil industry and government authorities in Tabasco opens up interesting
viewpoints onto the interplay of power, politics and meanings in current contestations over
neoliberal modes of governance in extractive industries. His comments also provide a point of
departure for understanding a range of shifting forms of resource governance and contestation
characteristic of large-scale extractive operations in the global South (Bebbington, 2012;
Watts, 2011; Zalik, 2009).
In this essay, we focus on contested claims to space and identity within the
context of hydrocarbon politics in Mexico. Placing the fishers, the oil industry and
government authorities at the centre of our inquiry, we seek the “how” of hybrid forms of
governance in contemporary extractive regimes (Appel, 2012). The struggles over resource
3
space in Tabasco are connected to the establishment of the zone of exclusion for all but the oil
industry in the Gulf of Mexico in 2003. This declaration has restricted the fishers’ access to
their fishing grounds and forced them to travel further out to sea, making their fishing
operations more demanding and dangerous. At the same time, the Mexican para-statal oil
industry is undergoing strong privatization and restructuration, and in order to boost
production, it is extending drilling activities along the coast of Tabasco. The ongoing
struggles for resource access are characterized by changing techniques of private-public co-
governance, fragmentation of the fishers’ political mobilization and the fishers’ shifting
tactics of networking.
The main focus in our analysis is on the ways that techniques of governance and
networks of contestation become shaped through the hybrid mechanisms of neoliberal oil
governance. Inspired by Stephen Collier’s (2009) Foucauldian approach, we examine how
modes of resource governance based on conventional forms of authoritarian control (Watts,
2004b; Zalik, 2009) become combined with techniques of disentanglement and indirect
governance (Appel, 2012; Himley, 2013). We argue that empirical analyses of neoliberal
governance would benefit from more attention being paid to the complex articulations of
different forms of governance. In Tabasco, within the shifting arenas of claim-making, for
example, market-based mechanisms of governance are mixed with clientelist politics,
producing a fuzzy ensemble. Fraternizing with the government enables the oil industry to
relocate the responsibility for negotiating local fishers’ demands for compensation to
government authorities. Acting as mediator between fishers and the oil industry, government
officials employ techniques that range from paternalist control to public-private regulation. At
the same time, the oil industry is subcontracting foreign companies to carry out socially
delicate oil exploration and drilling activities.
The challenges posed to local resource users by large development interventions
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have been analyzed in numerous studies on indigenous, peasant, human-rights and
environmental-justice struggles against mega industrial development projects (e.g. Carruthers,
2008; Doane, 2005; Perreault and Valdivia, 2010; Scholsberg and Carruthers, 2010; Watts,
2011). Many of these studies focus on contestations in which local communities have
succeeded in forming well-organized counter-movements with strategic links to transnational
networks (Gustafson, 2011; Haarstad and Fløysand, 2007; Sawyer, 2004). Our study, in
contrast, analyzes conflict over resource space and identity in a situation where local agendas
are heterogeneous and counter-efforts have remained fragmented. As Auyero and Swistun
(2009: 7-8. 12) note, these less visible struggles over resources and representation have
received little attention in academic studies on social movements, despite their relative
frequency.
In Tabasco, hybrid techniques of neoliberal governance tend to fragment the
efforts made by local resource users to institute legal claims and political mobilization,
making them seek resource access through everyday forms of connectivity. Here we link our
Foucauldian analysis of governmentality with a Deleuzian approach to rhizomatic subaltern
networks in order to analyze the fishers’ networking (Escobar & Osterweil, 2010; Lenco,
2014). The fishers’ endeavours in the contestation are mediated by their engagements with the
sea space and through the asymmetrical relations between fisher leaders and entrepreneurs
like Emilio, small-scale, licensed fishers and unlicensed, informal fishers, who have no
legally acknowledged position from which to negotiate with the oil industry. Through
ethnographic inquiry into the ambiguous forms of governing within the shifting oil regime
and the fishers’ everyday strategies of contestation, we seek to offer insights into the less
visible faces of power (Nuijten, 2004: 210) within the situated contexts of neoliberal
governance.
The following section presents post-Foucauldian theorizations of resource
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governance, combined with theoretical ideas of everyday contestation through rhizomatic
networks. The third section explains the context and the methods of the study. In the fourth
section, we move to analysis of the hybrid government-corporate strategies of resource
governance, followed by the fifth section’s examination of the fishers’ fractured attempts at
political contestation. The sixth section provides conclusions concerning the contested claims
of corporates and communities to resource governance characteristic of neoliberal extractive
operations today.
2. Governance, politics and fragmented networks
Emilio’s portrayal of the struggles over the occupation of the Tabascan offshore touches on
important themes in the current discussion of discursive strategies, political games and
identity codifications in the competition between extractive industries, government
institutions and local resource users for access to resource space (Hatcher, 2012; Perreault and
Valdivia, 2010; Watts, 2004a). Recent studies on governance have redeveloped Michel
Foucault’s concept of governmentality to better capture the processes of privatization,
deregulation and self-management involved in neoliberal modes of governance and subject-
formation (Collier, 2009; Ferguson, 2010; Rose et al., 2006). Within this discussion, Collier
(2009: 99) proposes an analysis of governance that makes visible the diverse ways in which
techniques and styles of reasoning are combined and become complex modes of governing.
Such an approach seeks to reveal neoliberalism as a “heterogeneous space, constituted
through multiple determinations, and not reducible to a given form of knowledge-power”. Our
study follows this line of thinking by tracing the mentality of governance in the hybrid
ensemble of discourses and political practices through which the governing of the sea space
and fishers’ subjectivity is being reformulated in Mexican oil politics.
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In his Foucault-inspired analysis of conflicts over oil extraction in Nigeria,
Michael Watts (2004a: 199) conceptualizes oil governance as a “complex” that constructs
“differing sorts of community”, with “differing sorts of identities, forms of rule and territory”.
This perspective of multiple actors, identities and spaces offers an interesting angle for
examining relations between the oil industry and local communities. Furthermore, Watts
(2004b: 55) suggests that examining the logic of both rule and unrule and thereby the
“perhaps ungovernable” spaces of oil politics is crucial for a more detailed understanding of
oil governance. Correspondingly, Tania Li (2007a: 277) notes that an analysis of governing
that goes beyond the “conduct of conduct”, can provide important insights into processes and
experiences “that cannot be reconfigured according to plan”.
Exploring what remains unexplained in oil politics by the mentality of
governance is crucial especially because, as Timothy Mitchell (2009) notes in his analysis of
oil and democracy, the material qualities of crude oil, as well as the investments and
technologies required for its transformation into a global commodity, make oil extraction
highly vulnerable to disruption. For this reason, the oil industry seeks to organize its
production into spatially isolated operations, separated from the social observation and
political pressure of civic movements (Zalik, 2009). By appearing to remove itself from local
social conflicts, the oil industry obscures the links between global projects of resource
appropriation and local experiences of resource exclusion (Appel, 2012; Ferguson, 2005).
These dynamics call for detailed analyses of how the strategies and techniques
of governing are implemented in particular times and places, and of their fragilities and
fractures, as well as of ambiguous negotiations and contestations between differently
positioned subjects (Li, 2007b; Nuijten, 2004). In Mexico, the economic and symbolic power
of Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) in national politics, together with the melange of legacies of
clientelism and new techniques of neoliberal governance, colour the globalizing oil sector’s
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relationships with local populations (Martínez Laguna, 2004). The tightened regulation of the
Tabascan offshore will probably impact on prevailing tensions over resource space between
the oil industry and heterogeneous groups of fishers in the near future.
In addition to resource management through legislation and public regulation,
oil regimes deploy other techniques to legitimize their operations and restrict the access of
local populations to resource spaces. In their research on hydrocarbon governance in the Gulf
of Mexico, Breglia (2013) and Zalik (2009) demonstrate how – apart from legal actions and
state-policing in the privatizing offshore – the Mexican government’s welfare interventions
are encouraging fishers to become entrepreneurial aquaculturists. Correspondingly, Sawyer
(2004), Breglia (2013) and Himley (2013) show how corporations are seeking to transfer local
claims to resource access from formal political arenas to voluntary programmes of corporate
social responsibility and community development. These actions are aimed at obscuring the
issues of environmental and social responsibility involved in extractive operations and hiding
the inherently political nature of the corporates’ actions.
These hybrid mechanisms of resource governance raise many questions
regarding contemporary struggles over resource access and cultural identity. Scholars inspired
by Deleuzian approaches to networks have taken up the concept of the rhizome to refer to
new forms of subaltern networking. Escobar and Osterweil (2010: 201) emphasize the
changing connections and mobilizations within subaltern networks, suggesting that a
rhizomatic perspective helps to convey a sense of that which is not “pure opposition or
resistance” but yet escapes control. Lenco suggests (2014: 139) that a Deleuzian approach
encourages the examination of emerging tactics of contestation within contexts of social
change, in a world where “uncertainties have replaced regularities”.
Detailed analyses of rhizomatic ways of networking may provide insights into
the logic that characterizes connections among heterogeneous groups of marginalized people
8
in contexts where institutional strategies of resource governance increasingly limit their
livelihood options and political tactics. In Tabasco, intensified control of the sea space by the
government and the oil industry has pushed fishers to deploy less visible tactics of
contestation among the different groups. The fishers’ mobile networks in offshore
“taskspaces” (Ingold, 2000: 195–198) and ambiguous political arenas are keys to
understanding their tactics of everyday resistance. Connecting post-Foucauldian ideas of
governmentality with Deleuzian notions of rhizomatic networks, we examine the political
arenas of oil and fishing not simply as spaces of authoritative intervention, but as constructed
through diverse claims by actors in dissimilar positions (Büscher, 2010; Mathews, 2009).
Empirical analyses of the conduct of conduct in struggles over resource access and identity
can provide valuable insights into the hybrid rules and regulations, and fragmented tactics,
characteristic of shifting forms of resource governance in today’s extractive industries.
3. Studying Mexican fish-and-oil politics
Coastal Tabasco contains a mixture of mangrove wetlands, coconut plantations and dozens of
fishing villages. Oil pipelines break up the verdant landscape and turquoise sea. The 190-km-
long coastline includes the major towns of Frontera, Paráiso and Sánchez Magallanes and
many small villages that are home to altogether approximately 7,000 fishers (Figure 1); about
half of them are unlicensed (pescadores libres).1 Fish and oil are tightly interwoven in the
lives of the coastal population, most of which is directly or indirectly engaged in at least one
of these activities.
The Tabascan fishing communities are far from homogeneous. There is
considerable intra- and inter-household differentiation according to age, gender, livelihoods,
1 The first author’s interview at the Secretaria de Desarrollo, 2011.
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social status and political position. Many of the unlicensed fishers work under more or less
casual arrangements for wealthier, license-holding fishing entrepreneurs (permisionarios).
Sea fishing, however, is not a part of women’s everyday life; rather, they specialize in
catching crabs, cleaning the catches of incoming fishing boats or working in collective fish-
farming operations (Saury Arias, 2010).Women also assist their husbands and other male
relatives in riverine and coastal fishing. The fact that the state authorities no longer grant
fishing licenses to new fishers but instead are trying to promote onshore aquaculture, causes
many difficulties for small-scale fishers, who do not have the legal status nor the resources
required for aquaculture. In this situation, struggles over identity and political representation
revolve around the issue of who is a “real fisher”: one that practices fishing, or one that holds
a fishing license.
The federal government actively promoted cooperative fishing from the 1940s
to the early 1980s. During this time, it was relatively easy for coastal people to find work in
cooperatives linked to the high-flying fish and shrimp industries. The cooperatives sold their
catch to the state-owned company, Ocean Garden, which then exported the fish and shrimp to
the USA. In the 1990s, the Mexican government opened the fishing industry to private
investment. With cuts in government subsidies, overfishing and Pemex’s operational
expansion, the shrimp and fish industries collapsed and, currently, Tabasco accounts for only
1.4 percent of national fish production (Saury Arias, 2010: 43, 102). Meanwhile, the
heterogeneity of fishers, competition over restricted resource space, and the large number of
unlicensed, informal fishers who have limited political rights, has fragmented the political
agendas of the coastal fishing communities.
Pemex, the eleventh largest oil company in the world and the third largest
exporter of crude oil to the United States (US EIA, 2012), producing approximately 2.5
million barrels of crude oil a day, figures in the everyday life of fishing communities in
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multiple ways.2 The Sonda de Campeche (Campeche Sound) in the Gulf of Mexico holds the
giant complex of the Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap oil fields, which together account for 51
per cent of Mexico’s oil production (Pemex, 2013). Over 200 oil-production platforms and
roughly 160 foreign companies operate in the Campeche Sound as suppliers. Since the
establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, the Mexican
government has opened the energy sector to global investment and given transnational
companies access to oil exploration and drilling under subcontracts with Pemex (Martínez
Laguna, 2004). The new Ley de Hidrocarburos (Hydrocarbons Law) and Ley de Ingresos
sobre Hidrocarburos (Hydrocarbons Revenues Law), created under President Enrique Peña
Nieto’s administration, allow Pemex to make licensing, production-sharing and profit-sharing
contracts with private companies (DOF, 2014a; 2014b). These reforms and the expansion of
extractive operations to Tabascan coastal areas will considerably increase the oil industry’s
influence on the livelihoods and living conditions of the fishing communities in the future.
Land-based oil extraction began in Tabasco in 1949, eleven years after President
Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated the oil industry from foreign companies (Zalik, 2006). Pemex
launched a major development of Tabascan offshore oil reserves in 1977–1980 (Beltrán,
1988: 52). With the ramping up of oil production, local populations began to recognize the
wide-scale impacts of the oil industry on their living environment (Tudela, 1989: 248–254).
Since the appearance of the industry in offshore waters, the fishers have reported on oil spills
that have damaged their fishing equipment and caused fish death, and with the recent oil
explorations along the coast, the fishers claim that the noise of the exploration boats is scaring
fish away from their habitats.
Unlike the rapid transfer of production sites in many other global industries, oil
production is difficult to move in cases of any kind of conflict because oil reserves are
2 Pemex, Statistics: “Producción de petróleo y gas”, 2013.
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physically embedded and the investments required for extraction are high (Ferguson, 2005;
Zalik, 2009). Consequently, the Mexican government imposed initial security restrictions on
movements near oil installations in the late 1990s (Arias Rodríguez and Ireta Guzmán, 2009:
13) which were formalized under a 15,907-km2 zone of marine exclusion around oil
installations in the Gulf of Mexico in 2003 (Figure 2). The zone was established under the
federal legislation “Acuerdo Secretarial No. 117”, based on the power of ejectment granted to
the Secretaría de Marina (Naval Secretariat, SEMAR) (DO, 2003). This agreement prohibits
any activity other than oil extraction within the zone. While the agreement was justified by
arguments of preventing terrorist attacks and enhancing national security, one of its aims
seems to have been to avert offshore social confrontation in order to ensure undisturbed oil
production. Similar restrictions may also gain prominence close to the coastline as the oil
industry plans to increase the number of coastal operating oil platforms in the traditional
fishing waters of the local population from two in number to sixteen in the coming years.3
This study is based on empirical research into multiple actors. The first author
carried out six months of ethnographic fieldwork among fishers, government and oil industry
actors on the coast of Tabasco and in the state’s capital, Villahermosa, in 2011–2012. During
this time, she lived first with the family of a political leader among the fishers, and then with
that of an unlicensed fisher. Participation in the fishers’ lives provided insights into their daily
activities, social networks and political strategies. This part of the study included 40
ethnographic interviews, dozens of informal conversations, and implementation of the
methods of participant observation.
Both authors took part in the study of government and oil industry actors, which
consisted of numerous interviews and participation in meetings and workshops with the
representatives of government institutions, the oil industry and fishers. The first author
3 The second author’s interview with Pemex staff person, 2011.
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conducted 35 interviews with government authorities and representatives of the oil industry in
2011 and 2012. The second author carried out 21 interviews with government authorities and
representatives of the oil industry from 2011 to 2014, also participating in two workshops
organized for representatives of global oil companies in Mexico: the first entitled “Conflict
management in the oil production areas” and the second, “Corporate responsibility in the oil
industry”. Participation in these workshops offered valuable information about oil industry
perspectives on resource governance, including market-driven codes of conduct and
programmes of community development.
Both authors reviewed relevant government documents, development plans
concerning the oil industry and fishing, the oil industry’s social responsibility reports and
other public documents. Access to the complex networks of Mexican fish-and-oil politics was
highly challenging and required considerable flexibility in our field research. The sensitivity
of the research topic, and the politically tense relations between the oil industry, government
authorities and different kinds of fishers, required multi-faceted negotiations and efforts to
build trust and protect the informants’ anonymity. These conditions also required strategies to
secure the safety of the informants as well as our own. To improve the reliability of our
argumentation, we carefully cross-checked information from the different sources of research
data, a process that included multiple comparisons: between different interviews we had each
conducted; between the sorts of information that the informants gave us on different
occasions; and between the information gathered through interviews and that of participant
observation and complementary documentary material.
4. Governing the sea
4.1. New negotiation procedures
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In the late 1990s, foreign oil exploration subcontractors appeared in Tabasco’s coastal waters,
causing restrictions on the fishers’ seagoing movement. In a news story by the regional
newspaper Presente, published January 11, 2002, two fisher leaders questioned the curious
anonymity of the buques exploradores (exploratory boats) in the port authority’s notification
about the geophysical studies for oil deposits. The fishers said the notice did not identify the
company subcontracted for the exploration, yet ordered fishers to stay out of its way. Within a
year, the zone of exclusion was established.
At the time of our fieldwork in 2011, another transnational geophysical
subcontractor for Pemex was exploring oil deposits along the coastline of Tabasco. Yet the
strategies for informing the public were virtually unchanged from those of ten years earlier.
The notification, distributed by the port authority, included detailed information about the
coordinates and timetables of exploration and the Pemex logo, but the authority to contact in
case of inquiries was the port officer. There was no mention of the company in charge of
exploration.
 These information-control measures form part of the socio-spatial
regularization of the Tabascan sea space and the fishing population in the context of
intensified integration of Mexican oil resources into global networks of production and trade.
The conditions of a “petro-state” (Watts, 2005: 384), in which the Mexican government
received about $50.3 million in oil revenues in 2010, accounting for a third of the
government's tax income (Pemex, 2010: 9, 16–17), link the Mexican political economy into
volatile global oil markets and geopolitics. In the hybrid forms of resource governance,
legislative measures and government-led techniques of oversight are combined with market-
based incentives and the mechanisms of public-private co-governance. Together these
techniques mediate the fishers’ access to resource space and reformulate their institutional
representation as resource users who are economically inefficient and/or politically
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threatening.
Government agencies play an important role in these hybrid forms of
governance. In our interviews, both Pemex and state government representatives noted that
earlier forms of personalized settlements between fishers and the oil industry created an
“industry of claim-making” (“industria de reclamación”), whereby fishers purportedly
blamed Pemex for diverse harms and Pemex settled the claims in order to secure its oil
production operations. Under current arrangements, the state-level Secretaría de Energía,
Recursos Naturales y Protección Ambiental (Secretariat of Energy, Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection, SERNAPAM), acts as a mediator in negotiations over
compensation for environmental harm, economic loss and social disturbance caused by the oil
industry to the fishers. Both the oil industry and government representatives considered these
new procedures to be much more transparent than those in place earlier which, they claimed,
allowed room for clientelist deals. According to them, compensation claims are now dealt
with more uniformly and equitably under the supervision of state authorities. As an official in
SERNAPAM explained:
This new approach was initiated in response to an industry of claim-making, where
people claimed compensation from Pemex and Pemex paid out for whatever damage.
Now we’re trying to get rid of this kind of social tutelage. We’re setting norms for
coordinated actions, so that people are able to negotiate in coordinated fashion with
governmental agencies.
(Second author’s interview at SERNAPAM, 2012)
Using state authorities as intermediaries is an important part of the oil industry’s indirect form
of governance as, in compensation negotiations in particular, it makes it difficult for fishers to
identify who is responsible for what and to whom. Yet, while officially emphasizing
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transparency and social responsibility, in practice the oil industry and government agencies
are engaged in various sorts of extra-legal reparation and informal horse-trading in order to
control fishers’ contestation tactics. The aim of the techniques of public-private co-
governance is to give the appearance of the government being in control of resource
regulation, thereby forestalling fishers’ political mobilization.
The same holds true with regards the regulation of the fishers’ access to offshore
areas. The zone of exclusion, situated 30–40 kilometres off the Tabasco coast, includes an
“area of marine prevention” of 15,907 km2 through which the “fast transit” of fishing boats is
allowed (Figure 2). The actual “area of exclusion” of 5,794 km2 is closed to all traffic except
that involved in oil drilling (Diario Oficial, 2003). Prior to the establishment of the zone of
exclusion, Tabascan fishers enjoyed some of their richest hauls around the oil platforms,
which act as artificial reefs and attract fish. Furthermore, the platforms provided shelter for
the fishers during heavy storms and the opportunity to exchange fresh fish for other foodstuffs
with platform workers. Despite the official discourse of national security, cordoning off the
marine area seems to be a preventative act to manage potential social conflict with fishers,
especially in light of the platforms to be established close to the Tabascan shore.
Government/industry co-governance has, however, not been an entirely smooth
road. Pemex often blames state institutions for sustaining conventional relations of patronage,
while state authorities accuse Pemex of avoiding its responsibility and using state officials as
shields in fending off fishers’ accusations. With regards the zone of exclusion, Pemex
managers argue that Pemex, as a private company, has nothing to do with the federal
government’s national security legislation. Indeed, Pemex representatives assert that the
federal government established the zone and it is the Mexican Navy that is mandated to
enforce legal regulations therein. As a high-ranking Pemex official conceptualized the issue:
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Earlier we didn’t have so many problems with the fishers. It was mostly claims for
damage to their nets. Now they accuse us of invading their fishing areas. They ask
us, ‘Who gave you the authorization to displace us?’ But it was the federal
government that signed the agreement restricting fishers’ access. Pemex didn’t
intervene; it was the National Security [Forces].
(Second author’s interview with a Pemex staff person, 2011)
Like other global majors, Pemex also increasingly engages in market-based, self-regulatory
programmes of corporate responsibility which, together with various forms of compensation,
aim to mitigate tensions over the offshore space with local fishing communities. Yet even
here, it is the government officials that often facilitate these programmes, thereby enabling the
oil industry to carry out its activities with limited direct engagement with local people.
Moreover, as the programmes are based on voluntary agreements, they are largely beyond
public scrutiny. Like other transnational corporations, Pemex prefers private codes of conduct
and voluntary agreements, which provide more flexible, first-party verified regulatory
schemes than the law and mandatory regulation.
The increasing use of subcontractors both in oil extraction and in managing the
oil industry’s relations with the local communities plays a strategic role in the new forms of
governing the offshore resource space and the coastal fishing population. For a company with
a past record of having managed some of the local people’s claims through questionable
deals, relocating the business of community relations increasingly to foreign subcontractors
disentangles Pemex from earlier practices. At the same time, it allows Pemex to follow the
lead of other global oil companies in establishing regulated relationships with local
communities (Breglia, 2013: 174–177). The recent production agreements require companies
contracted by Pemex to dedicate 1.5 per cent of their budget to community development,
while the use of subcontractors also serves to blur lines of responsibility. As is common in
17
private norms of regulation, Pemex does not take responsibility for the actions carried out by
its subcontractors; while the transnational subcontractors often shift the blame for
unsuccessful programmes or unaccomplished goals to Pemex.
In 2011– 2012, Pemex was carrying out a community development programme
in coastal communities together with one of its subcontractors. In this programme, which had
a budget of approximately $1.7 million, the companies donated 150 two-stroke motors and
100 equipment kits for navigation, safety and motor repair to licensed fishers. In November
2011, at a meeting held to decide on procurement of the motors that included representatives
of the fishers, Pemex and the subcontractor, a fisher leader “welcomed” the participants with
an aggressive rant blaming Pemex for decreasing catches. The fishers then accused the oil
industry of delaying the procurement. The subcontractor nervously assured the incensed
fishers that the motors would arrive eventually, but that it all depended on Pemex. Finally, the
meeting calmed down when oil industry representatives started to ask the fisher leaders about
the exact type of motors they were requesting. The course of the meeting seemed to follow a
script that was familiar to the actors involved. Both the fisher leaders and the oil industry
representatives knew that after the fisher leaders had been able to perform the role of an
intrusive claimant, the oil industry would buy them off with clientelist techniques.
The community development programmes offer the oil industry an arena for
political negotiation on compensation for lost marine space, even though representatives of
the oil industry have not officially admitted to their having such a role. The new techniques
provide the oil industry with a venue in which to continue clientelist arts of governance, while
the subcontractor, by taking up the role of facilitator, diffuses questions of responsibility.
While the programmes seem to prevent fishers’ frustration at the lost resource space from
developing into an organized protest movement, everybody realizes that the programmes as
such can hardly compensate the fishers for their restricted resource access and the changes in
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their way of life.
4.2. Transforming sea fishers to fish farmers
With the objective of identifying alternative livelihood strategies for fishers constrained by
the restricted access to offshore, a new negotiating body, la mesa pesquera, was established in
2009, comprising representatives of fishers, Pemex, state-level SERNAPAM and federal-level
Secretaría de Gobernación (Secretariat of the Interior, SEGOB). Although it lacks legal
authority, all representatives considered it an important step towards greater transparency on
the part of what amounts to a fortress-like oil company that had never previously sat at round-
table negotiations with fishers. The major activities of the body have been the formulation of
the oil industry’s social responsibility programmes and the establishment of a fund to provide
loans for fishing and fish farming to licensed fishers.
The fishing license is the key to attaining status as a legally constituted fisher
with official resource rights and a politically recognized fisher identity in Mexico. As the
federal Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación
(Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food, SAGARPA)
no longer issues fishing licenses to new fishers, the fishing communities are increasingly
divided into those with a license and thus with access to the compensation paid by the oil
industry, and those without and thereby denied the opportunity to negotiate with the oil
industry. Due to the political and symbolic power associated with the fishing license,
licensing is a heated issue between the government and the fishers, and it remains intense
despite the government’s efforts to present licensing policy as a neutral, technical affair, in
which restriction is considered to “discipline” fishers to prevent over-fishing. As the
following excerpts illustrate, a strict division between legally constituted, licensed fishers and
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uncontrollable, clandestine fishers characterizes the discourse of government agencies and the
oil industry on the regulation of sea space:
The fishers operate in the federal zone. It’s a real chaos. The only way to create order
there is through licenses.
(First author’s interview with a government official, 2011)
We only work with organized fishers. We don’t work with pescadores libres because
anybody who wants to can suddenly decide to identify himself as a
fisher…Pescadores libres are not legally recognized fishers.
(Second author’s interview with a Pemex official, 2011)
In arguments to support increasing control over offshore access, Tabascan state officials also
used categorizing discourse that problematized fishers as reliable citizens and responsible
resource users (Lund (2011: 889). Fishers were “impossible to negotiate with” because they
were unwilling to cooperate among themselves. They were said to be cunning, dishonest and
greedy. This discourse resembled what Sawyer (2004: 76) records when an indigenous
Ecuadorian activist mimics the discourse of an oil company’s chief executive on the people of
Amazonia: “We can’t work with those indios. They can’t even agree on what they want. They
are always fighting.” In arguments for and against particular identities and forms of living,
categorical labels of class, race and ethnicity are often used to justify differentiated access to
resources (Povinelli, 2011; Lund, 2011). By presenting the fishers as the culprits of their own
social abandonment, government officials and oil-industry representatives justify tightened
access to the offshore space.
As a way to manage the conflicts related to the fishers’ loss of resource access
and endangered sea-fishing livelihoods, the government has proposed “rural development”
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programmes based on the idea of transition to aquaculture. Through these “conversion
programmes” (reconversión pesquera), the government aims to transform sea fishers into
entrepreneurial fish farmers, assuring fishers that “what they catch in the sea, they can equally
produce onshore” (Arias Rodríguez and Ireta Guzmán, 2009: 3). One of the government’s
arguments for promoting fish farming has been to protect key Mexican fish stocks from
overexploitation. This discourse obscures the oil industry’s offshore expansion as the main
reason for the fishers’ displacement and attributes decimation of local fisheries to fisher
indifference, thereby making fishers appear responsible for the conflicts over sea space.
According to coastal fishers, the shift to aquaculture would serve to ensure exclusive access to
the sea space for the oil industry.
In 2011, the Fideicomiso del Fondo de Reconversión Pesquera (FIFOPESCA)
provided six million pesos to Tabascan fish farmers to invest in the cultivation of tilapia,
oyster and shrimp. However, fishers must first comply with a long list of requirements such as
environmental-impact assessments and water-use accountings before they are eligible to apply
for state funds. Only 1ten per cent of the currently registered 140 cooperatives and private
license-holders, and none of the approximately 3,000 unlicensed fishers in coastal Tabasco
are involved in aquaculture. The fish-farming programmes tend to favour better-off producers
who have the capacity for long-term investments, while, in our interviews, few fishers saw
fish farming as a realistic proposition for small-scale operators. In addition to lacking land,
possession of which is a legal requirement for fish farming, fishers found that raising fish in
ponds was a very different way of life and thus not an easy transition for those who have
made their living from the sea since childhood. Nevertheless, many fishers struggle to meet
the requirements for funds from these state-led development projects that carry the hopes of
gaining extra income through paternalist engagement with the state. Indeed, Nuijten (2004:
223) calls this form of governmental power a “hope-generating machine”. With the restricted
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access to the sea, many Tabascan fishers are being persuaded to seek the support provided by
the state to encourage them to become entrepreneurial fish farmers.
For the fisher leaders who saw the government-promoted shift to aquaculture as
a way to control fishers’ access to the offshore areas, this strategy became palpable in
December 2012 as the Commission of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery in the Congress of
Tabasco invited them and the representatives of aquaculture organizations and universities to
discuss the proposed Ley de Acuicultura y Pesca del Estado de Tabasco (Tabasco’s
Aquaculture and Fishing Law). Most of the bill’s 39 pages were devoted to the regulation of
aquaculture, with few references to sea fishing. When participating in the forum, it became
obvious for us that the approximately one hundred forum invitees were merely witnesses to
decisions that had already been made. Considering that the law had been written primarily
with fish farming in mind, two fisher leaders, including Emilio, offered critical comments on
the bill while tactically deploying paternalist discourse in describing themselves as
“pescadores simples” (“simple fishers”). The two leaders noted that legal requirements
demand that officials arrange consultative workshops with fishers in each municipality when
preparing such legislation. As it was too late for such hearings, the leaders demanded a few
strategic reformulations to the bill in order to ensure that the legislation would also serve as an
instrument for sea-fishing policy. Seven days later, the Mexican Congress approved the
original bill with no changes.
In general, the hybrid modes of resource governance combine legal measures
and public regulation with market-based incentives and techniques of indirect governing,
thereby obscuring the role of the oil industry in the re-regulation of the fishers’ resource
space. Fishers’ political claims for resource access are located under the oil industry’s
voluntary community-development programmes and government-mediated, extra-legal
negotiations. Such modes of governance work towards political displacement of fishers as
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legal subjects, meanwhile urging them to become responsible resource users and
entrepreneurial fish-farmers. The portrayal of fishers’ displacement from the sea as inevitable
in order to assure national security and environmental sustainability makes the economic
incentives offered by the oil regime to shift fishers’ from the sea to the land appear almost
like genuine charity.
5. Networks, mobility and contestation
5.1. Legal claims and fragmented political mobilization
Although the juncture of the chocolate-coloured waters of the deltaic Grijalva-Usumacinta
River with the turquoise clarity of the Gulf of Mexico long provided rich hauls for coastal
fisher folk, the fishers claim that once abundant sharks have now all but disappeared because
of noise from oil extraction. Also gone are the shrimp, the tortoises and the crocodiles. For
several decades, the fishers and the oil industry have co-existed offshore with varying degrees
of success but, even with the oil industry’s appropriation of the sea space, fishers continue to
consider themselves as rightful “dueños del mar” (masters of the sea).
During our conversations, the fishers’ political leaders frequently pointed out the
significance of statutory mechanisms such as the legal requirements for environmental impact
assessments and public hearings in their struggles for resource access and livelihoods. Within
the changing resource governance, legal measures and clientelist relationships represent a
familiar framework to fisher leaders; a game whose rules they know. Emilio’s calls to use the
framework of the law in reclaiming fishers’ right of access to the sea were based on the strong
social precedent in Mexico to recognise customary resource rights in legal and political
practice. Correspondingly, his comments at the above-mentioned Forum on the Aquaculture
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and Fishing Law were based on his knowledge that public hearings are mandatory when
planning significant changes in the fishers’ legal status.
Most fishers, however, are considerably less fluent in the law and statutory
process than their political leaders, a disparity that enhances the opportunities of leading
fishers to engage in political dealings with government officials and the oil industry. Some
governmental fishing authorities recently suggested that with the increasing number of oil
platforms near the Tabasco coast, fishers should be supported to engage in deep-water fishing
or marine aquaculture between the oil platforms. These plans enjoyed support from fisher
leaders, although it was clear that both activities would require considerable capital
investment. As many of the fisher leaders are commercial fishers, they calculated that in the
implementation of such policies, they might have better resources and access to government
subsidies than other fishers. In difference, most small-scale and unlicensed fishers, who need
to sell their labour through unequal contracts to commercial fishers or engage in informal
fishing, have a less advantaged position. These differentiations further fragment the efforts for
political mobilisation in already divided fishing communities.
The power mediated through fisher leaders and their clientelist ties to political
parties acted as a reference point by which fishers calibrate their understanding of the
reconfiguring regimes of oil extraction. From the fishers’ perspective, the gradual
transformation of the sea space from a contested commons to an enclave assigned exclusively
to the oil industry appeared to take place under a mandate of government and the then-ruling
Partido Revolucionário Institucional (PRI), while the opposition Partido Revolucionário
Democrático (PRD) was portrayed as an important supporter of fisher attempts to mobilize.
According to fisher leaders, negotiation with political parties continues to be crucial in the
struggles over resource space in order to avoid the risk of governmental repression. This holds
true even with shifting forms of governance through which a diversity of governmental,
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private and civil society actors is engaged in resource governance.
In terms of fishers’ contestative efforts, the establishment of the zone of
exclusion in 2003 precipitated a series of protest movements which they organized in alliance
with NGOs, journalists and politicians from different parties. At the demonstrations, the
fishers invoked their right to the sea as a resource space by referring to their cultural identity
as sea fishers, and nationalist concerns that the zone of exclusion had been established to
secure US energy needs. In 2004, the Fishers’ Federation, supported by 3,000 coastal fishers,
blocked a highway and demanded that the government abolish or at least relax restrictions on
the zone of exclusion. As an alternative, the fishers proposed a variety of compensatory
mechanisms, including expansion of the licensed offshore fishing area, aid for marine
aquaculture, subsidies for deep-water fishing, economic support or employment for fishers on
the oil platforms.
Under the heightened pressure, the federal government called off the restrictions
and increased the budget for the Tabascan fishing sector from the previous year’s 6 million
pesos to 25 million pesos. As a result of these strategic concessions, open political
confrontation withered. Once the situation was calmer, the exclusion-zone restrictions were
soon reinstated, with oil industry and government representatives both noting that
SERNAPAM-mediated meetings were the sole legitimate forum for airing fisher claims.
According to the fishers, their open resistance was co-opted through political horse-trading
between the oil industry, state authorities and their own leadership:
Fidel:    A man rose up to lead our resistance, and there was discussion that the
problem would be solved. This man has gobs of money now.
José:     They silenced him.
Matias: They gave him money; they silenced him.
Fidel:    He is rotting away in money! And the struggle did not achieve anything.
Ana:     Nothing…because they paid the fishers and the struggle dropped off.
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(First author’s group interview with fishers, 2012)
The ambiguous processes related to restricted resource access and the increased involvement
of foreign companies in oil extraction was a subject of intense discussion among fishers, for
whom the actual power relations in oil politics were unclear. During our fieldwork, fishers
usually portrayed the Pemex-state complex as the operator in charge, referring to transnational
subcontractors simply as “compañías” (“companies”). This choice of terminology was not
because the fishers did not know the subcontractors’ names; rather, it expressed the fishers’
concern about the legitimate masters of the sea under the new power configurations. By
referring to them as “las compañías” the fishers highlighted the subcontractors’ facelessness
in their co-operations with Pemex to transform the sea space from a contested commons to a
restricted enclave controlled by the Navy for the exclusive use of the oil industry. In this
situation, the actual names of subcontracted companies had little relevance.
The public image of oil production as an environmentally contaminating and
socially disruptive activity has made the global oil industry a special target of transnational
environmental, human-rights and social-justice movements in recent years (Perreault and
Valdivia, 2010; Watts, 2011). The environmental-social disaster resulting from the explosion
on a British Petroleum-owned offshore drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010
strengthened the position of transnational advocacy networks seeking greater responsibility
from the oil industry. These networks have recently developed strategic ties with various
indigenous, peasant, environmental and social justice movements in Mexico (Gúzman Ríos,
2009: 78–86).
Pemex, however, as a para-statal company has, until the ongoing energy-sector
privatization, enjoyed national jurisdiction and sovereignty which has to a certain degree
protected the company from becoming a target of transnational protest movements. Moreover,
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in accord with the nationalist discourse, protest movements are often presented in public as
counterproductive activities that impede the efficient utilization of the country’s hydrocarbon
resources. Since small farmers, fishers and trade unions organized a wide-scale political
movement, called Pacto Ribereño, against the oil industry in Tabasco in 1976–1983, Pemex
and the government have used strict measures to control such mobilizations. The techniques
employed have combined legal measures, economic compensation and political repression,
including imprisonment for political leaders (Guzmán Ríos, 2009). Given the fact that oil is
one of the principal sources of national wealth and revenue for Mexico, and an emblem of
symbolic power in national politics, Pemex expects strong government support in controlling
protest movements.
Overall, the heterogeneity of the fishers’ livelihoods and identities and the
hierarchical power relations between different groups of fishers, as well as between fishers,
fisher leaders, government authorities and oil industry representatives create multiple, and in
themselves contested, communities within the coastal fishing areas. These conditions mediate
the prevailing strategies to render the offshore resource space and the fisher population
governable. However, while the ambiguous recognition of different categories of fishers by
government authorities and the oil industry fragments the fishers’ efforts to organize their
political struggles, the fishers’ rhizomatic networks constitute spaces beyond effective control
(Watts, 2011) where the fishers seek to formulate mobile tactics of everyday contestation.
5.2. Tactics of mobility and endurance
Beyond clientelist co-opting and fragmented political mobilization, the fishers’ networks of
everyday connectivity mediate their relations to the sea as a taskspace, and their tactics for
dealing with the hybrid forms of neoliberal governance. Unlicensed fishers, in particular,
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create spaces for escape beyond institutional apparatuses of control, weaving their everyday
forms of resistance into their efforts to continue unrestricted utilization and free movement in
the marine environment. As Saury Arias (2010: 46) notes in his study of Tabascan fishing
communities, the only economic activity that has persisted in the coastal areas of Mexico
through successive economic crises and political turbulences is the “silent”, but consistent,
presence of fishing. Paraphrazing Povinelli (2011: 78), this silence is “not about sitting
quietly… waiting for the wizard to appear, or hanging out with the doorkeeper of law waiting
for permission to enter”. It is a space where the fishers’ rhizomatic ties operate, a field of in-
between-ness, located between what is now and what is imagined to become possible
(Escobar and Osterweil, 2010).
These attributes of mobility and everyday endurance are embedded in the
fishers’ sense of freedom and self-reliance when operating in the immense, unpredictable sea,
many kilometres away from life onshore. For sea fishers, the offshore is embedded in a
cultural logic of risk, survival and masculine values of physical force, self-reliance and
freedom (Saury Arias, 2010). These experiences, along with the constant uncertainty of
catching enough fish, are reflected in an unlicensed fisher’s comment:
You have to be patient if you want to be a fisher. Even though fishing is something
wonderful, it is always about the uncertain chances of being hit by miracle.
(First author’s interview, 2012)
The sea is a space where fishers’ embodied knowledge of the environment mediates their
sense of self and social alliances. At the same time, these rhizome-like connections provide
the fishers space to withdraw from and reinterpret the restrictive forms of resource
governance. A typical three-day fishing trip involves travelling beyond the zone of exclusion
to waters 40 to 100 kilometres from the coast. Three or four men share a five metre, often
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roofless, fibreglass boat, to catch red snapper, porkfish and sea bream with nets and long-lines
under demanding conditions. The fishers’ rhizomatic engagements offshore, that escape the
governing gaze of the oil industry and the government, resonate with the fishers’ view of their
right to the sea as an “unbound” environment, as well as their way of life as mobile sea
fishers. The spatial restrictions related to the zone of exclusion divide fishers increasingly into
those with the resources and courage to travel to risky offshore spaces far from the oil
platforms and those forced to compete within the scarce and overused coastal resources. As
one unlicensed fisher, who sold his catch to a fishing entrepreneur, explained about travelling
beyond the zone of exclusion:
I like being a fisher and being out at sea. This is what I’ve grown to do. I just
returned from a fishing trip to seventy nautical miles from here…What I don’t like is
that we have to go further and further each time. One travels out there without
knowing if one will return.
(First author’s fieldnotes, 2012)
In another interview, a cooperative fisher who, due to the offshore restrictions, had stopped
long-distance fishing and was fishing along the coastline and in the river, commented:
…now they are also here, on the fishers’ zone in the river. Pemex’s supply boats
bump into us as we go out to fish.
(First author’s interview, December 2011)
As an everyday form of resistance, some fishers flout the law and frequent oil platforms
anyway. Although policing of the zone of exclusion is under the Navy’s jurisdiction, Pemex’s
high-tech capabilities and infrastructure play a crucial role in zone surveillance. Pemex is
29
usually the one to inform the authorities about a zone incursion, while the Navy carries out
the policing operation. Breaching the zone carries a fine of 200 pesos per violation, and if a
fisher is caught three times, his boat is confiscated. Besides being necessary for survival,
everyday operation in “la zona de los pescadores” (“the zone of the fishers”) – as one of the
unlicensed fishers called the Gulf – is a tactic used by the fishers to stake a collective claim to
the sea space and their fisher identity and demonstrate their freedom. According to the fishers,
the endangering of their livelihoods and the questioning of their identity as sea fishers amidst
the aggressive expansion of the globalizing oil industry cannot be simplified to an issue of
economic compensation; it is also a question of social justice and environmental equity.
Fishers’ desires for their needs to be better considered in terms of resource
governance are also reflected in the ways licensed fishers engage with the oil industry’s
community development programmes. As an everyday form of protest against the
unwillingness of the oil company to recognize their resource rights, the fishers reinterpret the
programmes to better suit their needs. In the above-mentioned programme, where Pemex and
its subcontractor donated two-stroke boat motors, many fishers promptly sold their new
motors and invested the money in something they regarded as more important. In order to
ensure that fishers were complying with the programme rules, oil industry representatives
criss-crossed the coastal communities to inspect whether the motors were still in the
beneficiaries’ possession. Some fishers heeded the advice of fisher leaders who warned their
constituents not to sell their motors until after the inspection; others planned to go out and buy
used cars, gadgets or other items with the money. The fishers’ resistance to the oil industry’s
defining their needs seemed to be well-known among Pemex officials who, in the course of an
interview, inquired of us whether fishers had already begun selling the donated motors.
Similarly, the fishers played along with state efforts to transform them into fish farmers. In
order to obtain governmental subsidies, many fishers posed as environmentally sound,
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enterprising, potential farmers even if few of them actually considered fish farming a viable
alternative to sea fishing.
Meanwhile, as the oil industry and the federal and state governments are tightening the
fishers’ access to the sea, recent changes in environmental legislation at the federal level may
provide new opportunities for the fishers to stake collective claims for environmental
damages caused by the oil industry. The Ley de Acciones Colectivas (Law on Collective
Actions), which went into force in 2012, enables groups of at least thirty persons to raise
class-action claims for environmental harms caused by the oil industry. A group of fishers and
small-scale farmers from the interior of Tabasco, supported by environmental and human
rights NGOs, has already used the law as a basis for suing Pemex, its subsidiaries and the
involved government institutes for damages caused to the environment and local livelihoods
(Asociación Santo Tomás, 2013; IPS, 2013). If coastal fishers are able to meet the high
burden of demonstrating oil-derived environmental harms and verifying that those harms are
the cause of reduced fish catches, the case could bolster the fishers’ efforts to regain their
rights to the sea space and livelihoods as sea fishers. Within the globalizing oil industry and
the shifting forms of resource governance, the fishers’ struggles for a fair distribution of the
resource space and institutional recognition of their perception of the sea as a taskspace and a
living sphere depend on their opportunities to create efficient networks for contestation at
multiple scales.
Conclusion
This essay has analyzed the hybrid forms of governance that characterize the oil industry’s
operative expansion in the coastal and offshore areas of the Gulf of Mexico, and the involved
struggles over resource access and identity between sea fishers, the oil industry and the
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government. Building on post-Foucauldian approaches to governmentality and Deleuzian
perspectives to rhizomatic subaltern networks, the study has shown the shifting forms of
resource governance as intersections of dispersed claims and contestations by actors in
dissimilar positions. Our attention to the politics of, and power over, resource space and
identity in neoliberal contexts of resource extraction has been inspired by recent calls for
more careful consideration of the “how” of the conduct of conduct and the complexity of
contestations in the hybrid conditions of neoliberal governance (Appel, 2012; Collier, 2009;
Li, 2007; Watts, 2011).
The legislative restriction of fishers’ access to their former fishing grounds has
been complemented by a series of governing techniques that ultimately shape resource
governance into a fuzzy ensemble. This hybridity manifests itself in the intertwining of
clientelist deals and paternalist control of political representation with public-private co-
governance and techniques of obscuring responsibility in the regulation of resource access
and in the corporate programmes of community development. The federal government’s
centrality in managing the legislative changes that concern marine resources, and the state
authorities’ strategic role as intermediaries in the negotiations between the oil industry and the
fishers over compensations for environmental harm and social disturbance caused by the oil
industry, send contradictory messages to the fishers. On the one hand, the government appears
as a paternal authority, in control of the neoliberal governance shift; while, on the other,
strategic co-governance allows the government, Pemex and subcontractors to shift
responsibility for restricted resource access and inadequate compensation back and forth,
making it hard for fishers to distinguish which agency is in charge of responding to which of
their claims.
Overall, the hybrid modes of governance work to displace the local fishers from
the sea space and weaken their position in the arenas of political representation, whilst
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attempting to persuade them to stay onshore and become fish farmers. In such a situation,
where half of the practicing fishers are officially defined as not having a right to that identity,
the fishers’ mobilization is limited to rhizomatic networks and everyday forms of resistance.
Through these efforts, fishers seek to counter the drastic changes in their resource access and
in their way of life as sea fishers and to make what they can out of the community
development programmes designed by the government and oil industry. The fisher leaders’
tactics of political mobilization draw essentially on the strategic use of legislation, clientelist
relationships with the government and the oil industry, and earlier experiences of government
repression. At the same time, the fishers’ mobility in the elusively governable offshore
taskspace works as a means to escape from control and demonstrate tactics of everyday
resistance (Lenco, 2014). Nevertheless, with the growing regulation of the sea space and
fishers’ resource rights, these rhizomatic networks may in the future come under more
effective surveillance.
In recent years, extractive industries in many parts of Latin America have
deployed corresponding techniques of resource governance to render large resource spaces
governable. Neoliberal discourses and programmes of corporate social responsibility have
been combined with clientelist co-opting and indirect governing in the Peruvian Andes
(Himley, 2013) and Ecuadorian Amazonia (Sawyer, 2004). Most studies of these phenomena
examine situations where local resource users have succeeded in collectively mobilizing
against extractive industries. However, understanding contemporary struggles over resource
governance demands that we also consider the less visible, less governable and yet common
spaces of contestation  and counter-struggles for political representation that have received
relatively scant academic attention (Auyero and Swistun, 2009; Horowitz, 2011; Perreault and
Valdivia, 2010).
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The value of combining a post-Foucauldian approach to governance with a Deleuzian
perspective of rhizomatic networks lies in the assistance offered by the resulting framework in
tracking a detailed picture of the multifaceted claims and contestations. Extending
Foucauldian inquiry from the logic of governance to the “how” of actual practices of
governing, of negotiations and struggles over power and of local resource users’
interpretations of the shifting forms of resource governance, provides valuable insights into
the contextual variation and everyday complexity of neoliberal governance.
In Tabasco, the forthcoming extraction of coastal and offshore oil reserves will
increase the presence of platforms and submarine tubes in areas used by the local fishers and
thereby probably tighten the competition for resource space. The recent changes in Mexican
environmental legislation and transnational networks of environmental and social justice may
provide new opportunities for Tabascan fishers to reclaim their resource rights in the Gulf of
Mexico. However, even in this case, the access to the Gulf’s seafood resources may primarily
be gained by a few economically and politically well-positioned fishers.
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